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Director
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington, D.C. 20505

FILE

9 AUG 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kenneth E. deGraffenreid
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: NSDD on Evaluating the Protection of Sensitive
Information at Official United States Facilities
Abroad (C)

1. Attached is the Director of Central Intelligence-approved version of the subject NSDD, based upon meetings with conferees from the CIA, NSA and Department of State. Also attached is a spread sheet displaying the DCI draft, the Department of State's proposed rewrite and the National Security Agency's comments on the DCI draft. CIA has concurred in the DCI version. (C)

2. Review of these items leads to the following conclusions (U):

a. The State rewrite would make the DCI the operating official for the "tiger teams." It seems more appropriate for NSA to carry out this function, as originally proposed. (S)

b. The DCI draft provides the basis for NSA not only to perform the tiger team function, but also to conduct testing and analysis of technical penetrations found in information processing equipment and to perform R&D on technical penetration. (S)

c. The DCI draft provides for appropriate coordination of these functions and for the use of established organizational mechanisms and policies under DCI authority. It designates the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS), chartered by the DCI to coordinate Community efforts to counter technical penetration, as the coordinating mechanism. NSA's Systems Security Steering Group, which is concerned with computer security, is not the appropriate body to perform this function. The TSCS-formulated Procedural Guides provide policy guidance on counter-intelligence considerations as well as technical aspects of penetration "finds." (S)

d. Central coordination of the testing of finds is extremely important, because there are analytical facilities in CIA, FBI, and in DOE laboratories which have been performing such analysis, in addition to the capability NSA proposes to establish. (S)

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e. Paragraph 5e of the DCI draft has been modified to clarify the requirement that NSA provide instructors, as well as information, to the Interagency Training Center. Qualified teachers, as well as information, are needed to overcome the lack of understanding of the offensive state-of-the-art cited by NSA representatives as a shortcoming of the current TSCM program. (S)

f. The DCI draft appropriately recognizes the authorities of the Secretary of State and provides for the Secretary's approval of and participation in activities of the evaluation teams. (S)

3. The analysis above indicates that this draft has accommodated, to the extent possible without distorting existing DCI policies and responsibilities, the input of State and NSA. (S)

/s/
Eloise R. Page
Acting Director

Attachments:

- A. DCI Draft NSDD
- B. Spread Sheet